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Abstract 
This article argues that the sources of official and societal ambivalence towards civic nationhood 
in today’s Russia are found in the institutional instability and personalist dynamics of hybrid 
regime politics in the 1990s. Successful civic nation-building should institutionalize inclusive 
criteria for citizenship as a basis for policy-making, which in turn should create incentives for 
dominant ethnicities to embrace civic nationhood. While the shifting views of Boris El’tsin on 
nationalities policy and the constant turmoil in the government’s nationalities ministry have 
received little scholarly attention, they illuminate the endogenous sources of regime instability 
in relation to civic nation-building. Russia’s experience thus challenges the traditional view of 
ethnic nationalism as fostering authoritarianism and civic nationalism as fostering democracy: 
rather, competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s confounded the regime’s own efforts in civic 
nation-building and laid the groundwork for the ‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics under Vladimir 
Putin. 
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Why did civic nation-building fail in post-Soviet Russia? Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Russia’s new government declared its intent to democratize and embraced a civic nationality 
defined by territory and citizenship, rather than an ethnic understanding of nationality as based 
on language, culture, and kinship. Throughout the 1990s, Russian President Boris El’tsin 
promoted the idea of civic nationhood and almost exclusively used the non-ethnic term for 
Russian (rossiisskii rather than russkii).1 Russia’s federal system continued the Soviet-era 
practice of treating predominantly Russian regions as administrative-territorial (non-ethnic) 
                                                          
1 Both terms are confusingly translated into English as “Russian.” For a historical overview of the uses of 
“russkii” and “rossiiskii,” see Tishkov (2009). 
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units while providing territorial recognition for minority ethnicities. The nationalities policy 
concept adopted in 1996 characterized Russia as a multinational state while acknowledging the 
unifying role played by ethnic Russians (Ukaz Prezidenta… 1996). Ethnic identification was soon 
removed from citizens’ internal passports, further weakening the link between ethnicity and 
citizenship (Aktürk 2010).  
Despite these steps toward the formal institutionalization of civic nationality, the 
Kremlin often equivocated in official articulations of the nation. While it adopted civic 
understandings in domestic affairs, ethnic understandings of the nation persisted in relation to 
Russian diaspora in neighboring states (Shevel 2011a). In their daily lives, Russians use civic and 
ethnic terms interchangeably, though ethnic understandings of Russian (russkii) identity tend to 
be cultural rather than political in common usage while civic expressions (rossiiskii) could be 
taken as anti-ethnic (Rutland 2010). At other times, the civic expression is used to signal non-
Russian ethnicity (Miller 2009). 
In mass politics, the failure of civic nation-building is perhaps best exemplified by the 
transformation of ethnic Russians as the country’s dominant ethnicity into a significantly 
aggrieved group. Anti-migrant sentiment rose steadily throughout the 2000s, with state 
patriotism emerging as the main rubric for uniting statists and even opposition parties with 
ethnic nationalists (Kolstø 2016a; Laruelle 2014; Popescu 2012). The annexation of Crimea in 
2014, which President Vladimir Putin justified with reference to co-ethnicity and historical 
injustice, appeared the culmination of these trends (Putin 2014). Some observers perceived a 
dramatic ethnicization of official discourse of the nation in the accompanying surge of 
patriotism (Teper 2016; Blakkisrud 2016).  
On the heels of these political developments, it is tempting to seek explanations for the 
‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics in terms of the Kremlin’s perceived need to bolster its legitimacy 
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in the face of declining economic performance and rising protest sentiment (McFaul 2014). Yet 
the uses of official nationalism are often tactical and the Kremlin’s legitimacy-seeking shifts 
between claims about security and stability, civilizational belonging, international status, and 
historical traditions. Seeking an explanation for the ‘ethnic turn’ potentially neglects the 
underlying institutional conditions that enable such shifts in legitimacy-seeking – including the 
activation of ethnic nationalism and other forms of legitimation – especially when they run 
counter to civic nationality.   
This article argues that the sources of official and societal ambivalence towards civic 
nationhood are to be found in the institutional instability and personalist dynamics of hybrid 
regime politics in the 1990s. Observers frequently characterized Boris El’tsin’s regime as 
democratizing and attributed its difficulties in civic nation-building to challenges by political 
opponents in the midst of simultaneous political and economic transitions (Breslauer and Dale 
1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Tolz 1998). However, these obstacles to civic nation-building faded 
in the 2000s with the taming of opposition forces and growth of central state capacity, such that 
one must look elsewhere to explain the ongoing ambivalence in state and society concerning 
civic nation-building. Instead, the causes of failure in civic nation-building are more likely 
endogenous to hybrid regime dynamics, in which regime actors maintained a façade of formally 
democratic institutions while informally preventing their consolidation to facilitate clientelistic 
politics. To the extent that civic nation-building became a casualty of clientelism under El’tsin, 
Vladimir Putin inherited a malleable nationalities policy that allowed the Kremlin to re-define 
civic nationality to suit the regime’s purposes. In this sense, the ‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics is 
not an endgame but just the latest in an ongoing series of legitimacy-seeking moves.   
The next section explores the concept of civic nation-building, focusing on the role of 
dominant ethnicities and the conditions under which they are likely to embrace civic nation-
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building: namely, the presence of stable and democratic institutions. The following section 
addresses the weakness of civic national identification in Russia, focusing on the gap between 
formally civic nation-building policies and informal social and political practices. A detailed 
scrutiny of regime dynamics challenges the common perception of El’tsin as a champion of civic 
nation-building, most significantly in the constant flux within the Ministry for Nationalities.2 The 
many institutional changes in the ministry charged with conceptualizing and managing 
nationalities has received scant scholarly attention, though they are revealing of the 
endogenous sources of regime instability and ambivalence in relation to civic nation-building. 
Finally, the article considers the implications for legitimacy-seeking in Putin’s regime, as well as 
the broader theoretical insights for understanding social identities as arising from regime 
dynamics and institutional instability. 
 
CIVIC NATION-BUILDING AND DOMINANT ETHNICITY 
The notion of civic nation-building derives from the distinction between civic and ethnic nations, 
most commonly associated with Friedrich Meinecke’s (2015 [1907]) differentiation of cultural 
and political nations and Hans Kohn’s (2005 [1948]) opposition of Western and Eastern 
nationalisms. In Ernst Renan’s (1994 [1882]) sense of the nation as an “everyday plebiscite,” 
civic national boundaries coincide with citizenship, nationhood is territorial and state-oriented, 
and national identity is chosen rather than coerced. Civic nations are claimed to be more 
inclusive, tolerant, peaceful, and democratic than ethnically-defined nations (Spencer and 
Wollman 2005). If examined in terms of constitutional practice, civic nation-building tends to 
                                                          
2 The term ‘nationalities ministry’ is used, here, as a catch-all for the government entity primarily 
responsible for elaborating and overseeing nationalities policy. At various times its policy portfolio 
included responsibility for inter-ethnic relations, migrants, Russian diaspora, and federal relations. The 
actual entity changed status, names, and portfolios multiple times throughout the 1990s (see TABLE 1). 
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mean privileging individual rights and ensuring opportunities for participation in the nation’s 
political life.3 By contrast, the boundaries of ethnic nations are demotic and do not necessarily 
correspond with citizenship (A. D. Smith 1988). Instead, nationhood is derived from culture and 
perceived common descent rather than citizenship and the state (Connor 1993). Ethnic nations 
are thus claimed to be exclusive and intolerant in practice, with the implication that ethnic 
nation-states tend towards violence and authoritarianism (Greenfeld 1997; Ignatieff 1993).  
The civic/ethnic distinction is pervasive in scholarly and policy debates, though it 
remains equally controversial in academic studies. Historically, the organization of peoples into 
civic nations may reflect pre-political communal loyalties that involve neither choice nor 
democracy (Marx 2003). In this sense, critics argue that the civic nation is no less a myth (and no 
less cultural) than the ethnic nations claimed by nationalists (Yack 1996). Cheng Chen (2007, 28-
7) argues that the concepts are so closely connected that various manifestations of nationalism 
are better understood within major political traditions like liberalism or Leninism. Will Kymlicka 
(2001, 247) further takes issue with the perception that civic nations are tolerant and peaceful, 
noting that nationalist conflict may arise from attempts to assimilate national minorities into 
civic nations. Some even suggest that the civic/ethnic distinction may reflect the ethnocentrism 
of those advancing it (Brubaker 2004, 136–144).  
Acknowledging these theoretical challenges, Lowell Barrington (2006) argues that the 
civic/ethnic distinction remains useful from an analytical perspective as ideal types that serve 
prescriptive or diagnostic purposes. In a similar vein, Edward Koning (2011) holds that the 
distinction remains useful for categorizing and classifying nation-building policies even if it is a 
blunt and misleading tool for characterizing nations. If treated in this fashion, one may avoid 
                                                          
3 Greenfeld (1992, 11) acknowledges that one may also find “collectivistic-authoritarian” forms of civic 
nationalism, noting that “more often, though, collectivistic nationalism takes on the form of ethnic 
particularism, while ethnic nationalism is necessarily collectivistic.”  
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making reductionist claims about national identity, or suggesting that the success or failure of 
civic nation-building makes everyone either a citizen or an ethno-nationalist. Rather, the 
distinction generally is taken to refer to a nation’s membership criteria as ranging between 
inclusive (civic) and exclusive (ethnic) extremes. One may further distinguish between formal 
policies and informal practices concerning membership criteria, recognizing that official policies 
may differ substantially from the informal, quotidian practices of state and societal actors.  
From a policy perspective, then, successful civic nation-building should institutionalize 
inclusive criteria for citizenship that supplant ethnicity as a basis for policy-making, which in turn 
should create incentives for ethnic majorities to embrace civic nationality as a salient and 
meaningful category of identification. While ordinarily it is difficult to determine the direction of 
causality between formal policy and informal practices, the correspondence of regime change 
with the creation of a new, civic nationality means that one should see the impact of policies in 
terms of everyday identification with civic nationality in post-Soviet Russia. Conversely, if civic 
identification is weak – either compared with other social identities within Russia, or compared 
with civic identification in other civic nations – then one should seek explanations in terms of 
the policy environment and process.  
The role of dominant ethnicities is particularly worth stressing as critiques of civic 
nation-building tend to focus on the consequences for ethnic minorities. By contrast, research 
on dominant ethnicity represents “relatively uncharted territory, a vast field of inquiry which 
has been bypassed by the legions of scholars armed with conventional citizenship studies, 
nationalism and ethnic politics paradigms.” (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004, 67) In theory, 
demographically and culturally dominant ethnicities ought to benefit from civic nation-building 
insofar as their interests presumptively dominate political institutions regardless of whether 
rights are bound to individuals or groups. Internationally, the capture of the modern state by a 
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dominant ethnic group usually appears as “a perfectly legitimate form of representing ‘the 
people’ by its elite” such that even the use of the term “ethnic” tends to be associated with 
minorities (Wimmer 2004, 35). In domestic politics, dominant ethnicities tend to associate their 
values and interests with civic or universal values – a discursive tactic that makes the articulation 
of minority ethnic interests appear particularistic and even extremist. Hence, the ongoing 
commitment of ethnic majorities to a political system that ensures their cultural and political 
domination tends to be taken for granted. 
In the 25 years since the initiation of civic nation-building in Russia, survey data and 
qualitative field research suggest the result is ongoing societal ambivalence and possibly even a 
reverse ethnicizing process. The widely cited World Values Survey in 2011 (Inglehart et al. 2014) 
seemingly found powerful support for civic national identification, with 64% of Russian 
respondents strongly agreeing that they felt themselves to be rossiyane – a response that was 
stronger than even in countries traditionally identified as civic nations like the United States or 
Spain.4 However, this identification was made without reference to any other social identity, 
such that one should be cautious in drawing conclusions about the intensity or salience of civic 
identification. Indeed, only 29% indicated that they were “very proud” of being rossiyane – 
substantially lower than Spain or the United States (See FIGURE 1). Drobizheva’s (2017) research 
confirms that civic national identification is weak relative to other social identities: Russians 
most frequently feel a sense of unity with their generational cohorts, professional cohorts, and 
with co-ethnics, while unity on the basis of citizenship lags behind income or place of residence 
(see FIGURE 2). These findings resonate with recent qualitative research. In more than 60 in-
                                                          
4 It may be worth noting that the question’s wording differed significantly for other countries, potentially 
producing radically different interpretations for respondents. For instance, the same question was 
phrased in the United States survey as, “I see myself as part of the United States” rather than “I feel 
myself to be an American.” 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
8 
 
depth interviews conducted by the author with a variety of Russian citizens in 2014-2016, a 
constant refrain among respondents was that citizenship is a purely legal category lacking any 
corresponding normative dimension or social significance (Goode 2018).5  
Survey data from the Levada Center (2018) potentially even suggests an opposite trend 
in relation to ethnic Russian identification, with assessments of ethnic Russians as a great nation 
rising significantly by the end of the 1990s (and more slowly since the 2000s) while views of 
Russians as a nation “like any other” fell (see FIGURE 3). One also finds that anti-migrant 
sentiment grew throughout the 2000s and has remained high despite some fluctuation since 
2012 (see FIGURE 4). In probing the sources of intolerance, Alexseev (2010, 96) observes that 
ethnic Russians were “consistently more hostile and less tolerant toward migrants than ethnic 
non-Russians.” However, he discovers that titular ethnic minorities are more hostile towards 
migrants than non-titular minorities, suggesting that anti-migrant sentiment is driven by social 
dominance and political status. Herrera and Kraus (2016) also find a link between socially 
dominant ethnicity and xenophobia.  
This process of ethnicization extends even to the state census. Russia’s 2002 census 
included a write-in box for respondents to indicate their nationality, but 66% of respondents 
had difficulty with the concept of nationality in test runs and were prone to confuse questions of 
citizenship with ethnicity, answering, “I already said – I’m russkii.” In the same vein, 65-75% of 
census-takers believed that it was possible for respondents to answer the question of 
nationality incorrectly (Stepanov 2003, 42–44). In the following 2010 census, a former census-
taker recalled that, “a lot of people insisted, “write that I am Russian [russkii],” even though it 
was obvious from…their name and appearance that they could not be ethnic Russian. That is to 
                                                          
5 This fieldwork was sponsored by a Fulbright Research Grant in 2014-2016. I am grateful to Ekaterina 
Semushkina and Valeriya Umanets for their research assistance. 
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say, ethnic Russian [russkii] and Russian citizen [rossiyanin] are blurring together.”6 In this sense, 
the formal replacement of the dominant ethnonym with civic nationality has not been 
particularly successful in practice. While the criteria for obtaining citizenship (or, for 
membership in the nation) do not depend on ethnicity in terms of policy, ethnic identification 
not only remains salient but even threatens to ethnicize civic nationality in daily life.  
 
HYBRID REGIME DYNAMICS AND CIVIC NATION-BUILDING  
From a formal institutional standpoint, Russia’s policies concerning citizenship, immigration, and 
federalism encourage civic nation-building. The 1993 constitution guarantees the equality of 
Russian citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion. Russian (rossiiskii) citizenship and the name of 
the Russian Federation (Rossiskaya Federatsiya) are clearly distinct from the Russian ethnonym 
(russkii). While any citizen may form or participate in a political party, parties are required to 
have members in at least half of Russia’s regions and ethnic parties are banned. Immigration 
policy in the 1990s was similarly inclusive, particularly in offering Russian citizenship to anyone 
formerly bearing Soviet citizenship. As a regional hegemon and economic power in the post-
Soviet sphere, Russia quickly became a default destination for displaced peoples and later for 
migrant labor (Malakhov 2014), making it “one of the most open countries in the world both in 
terms of emigration and immigration.” (Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya 2010, 120)  
The constitution also acknowledges that Russia is a multi-national state and provides 
ethno-federal accommodation for significant minority ethnicities. The federal system further 
divides the ethnic Russian population among 57 regions (out of 89 total regions in 1993).7 If one 
                                                          
6 Author’s interview, Perm’, November 26, 2015. 
7 In examining the survival of ethnofederal systems, Henry Hale (2004) argues that the presence of a core 
ethnic region not only promotes the breakdown of authority between central state and ethnic regions, 
but also suggests a plausible, exclusionist alternative to statehood for dominant ethnicities (which also 
enhances threat perceptions among ethnic minorities). The absence of a core ethnic region may thus be 
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includes Crimea and Sevastopol, the number of these regions today is 59. Attempts to merge 
some ethnic and administrative-territorial regions in the 2000s slightly reduced the number of 
ethno-federal regions, while the overall effect of such mergers and other federal reforms in the 
context of Putin’s centralization of power was to encourage the perception of the Russian 
Federation as an increasingly homogeneous cultural and political space (Goode 2011; 
Sharafutdinova 2013).  
By connecting rights and protections to an inclusive definition of citizenship, the state 
appeared to incentivize civic nationality without forcing ethnic Russians to choose between civic 
and ethnic identities. What, then, accounts for the popular ambivalence and ethnicization of 
civic national identity? Returning to the distinction between formal institutions and informal 
practices concerning the criteria for membership in the nation, a significant factor contributing 
to ethnic majorities’ acceptance of civic nation-building is the presence of stable and democratic 
institutions to ensure consistent representation and protection of dominant ethnic interests 
regardless of parties or individuals in power. Stable constitutional rules are essential for 
cultivating a sense of civic nationhood, otherwise civic national projects are unlikely to resonate 
either with elites or the broader population. As Rutland (2010, 122) wryly observes, “a civic 
national identity that is dictated from above is arguably a contradiction in terms.” Yet Claus Offe 
(1991, 516) notes that a crucial issue in postcommunist transitions is “the absence of a fixed set 
of trustworthy or at least uncontested social facts and binding institutions,” such that all politics 
becomes contingent. For elites in post-communist Russia, the determination (or non-
determination) of those rules for becoming national must therefore be understood as tactical in 
                                                          
considered a minimal formal necessity to ensure that ethnic majorities do not reject a civic national 
project in favor of an ethnically-defined nation. This was successful to the extent that Russian regions 
proved unwieldy as a basis for political mobilization against the state in the 1990s, as witnessed by the 
failed attempt to create an Urals Republic (Herrera 2005) or the inability of inter-regional associations like 
Siberian Accord (sibirskoe soglashenie) to succeed as political platforms (Hughes 1994). 
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relation to establishing formal and informal constitutional rules and managing economic re-
distribution in the course of regime transition.  
Offe’s observation foreshadowed the combination of informal politics and formal 
institutional facades prevailing in the hybrid regimes of post-communist Eurasia. While 
democratizing states strengthen formal constitutional rules over time, competitive authoritarian 
regimes subvert them to preserve power while no individual actor is powerful enough to 
monopolize politics (Hale 2014; Levitsky and Way 2010). Unlike democratizing regimes, then, 
the political dynamics of hybrid regimes mitigate the potential for civic nation-building by 
undermining rather than consolidating the formal institutional order. As politics become more 
autocratic and elite-oriented, informal networks become more meaningful for ethnic minorities 
who, in turn, have fewer incentives to participate in formal institutions that do not provide 
protection from domination by core ethnicities. By the same token, dominant ethnicities have 
fewer incentives to press for reform of malfunctioning institutions and settle instead for ‘bad 
enough’ governance (Melville and Mironyuk 2016).  
In this vein, civic nation-building was not so much a casualty of conflicts between center 
and regions or the Kremlin and opposition parties, but the tactical uses and re-definition Russian 
nationality in intra-regime conflicts. Alena Ledeneva (2006) documents in the case of El’tsin’s 
Russia how personalist networks and informal elite practices simultaneously sustained and 
undermined formal institutions. Russia’s first Nationalities Minister Valerii Tishkov (1997, 63) 
observed that El’tsin was more of a pragmatist than scholar in dealing with nationalities issues. 
The following section investigates how this pragmatism and his intuitive sense of Russian 
exceptionalism came to be reflected in the constant turmoil in the government’s nationalities 
ministry and the gradual absorption of its portfolio (and staff) into the Presidential 
Administration. In turn, as nationalities policy-making became increasingly ‘presidential,’ it 
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placed greater emphasis on the needs and concerns of ethnic Russians. The consequences were 
two-fold: civic nationality failed to become a meaningful social identity among ordinary 
Russians; and in elite circles, the pragmatic approach to civic nation-building left El’tsin’s 
successor unconstrained in appropriating Soviet-era symbols and opposition nationalist 
demands, abolishing the nationalities ministry, and advancing patriotic justifications for 
autocratization and irredentism.  
 
EL’TSIN’S IDENTITY POLITICS AND RUSSIA’S NATIONALITIES MINISTRY8 
El’tsin is commonly portrayed as a staunch defender of a civic or territorial definition of 
nationality despite domestic opposition. Yet he devoted little attention to national identity in his 
memoirs compared to his political rivals, focusing instead on political struggles and his rise to 
power (Tolz 1998). His understanding of Russian national identity was instinctive rather than 
deliberative or explicit. Class, positions in power structures, and available resources rather than 
nationality defined actors in his oeuvre. In fact, El’tsin’s campaigning on national identity issues 
in 1990 was so uncharacteristic that it was viewed as a cynical power-seeking move in Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s camp, with Party secretary Vadim Medvedev complaining that, “he has become a 
Russian patriot, although he never gave a thought to Russia until now” (Colton 2008, 184).  
From the start, El’tsin’s commitment to civic nation-building was mixed with appeals to 
Russian exceptionalism – that is, the notion that Russia operates in accordance with its own, 
unique rules and occupies a privileged role in international history and world affairs. While 
exceptionalism is distinct from ethnic nationalism, they blend together when the source of 
uniqueness is claimed in ethno-cultural terms. Writing on the heels of the October 1993 crisis 
                                                          
8 Unless otherwise noted, all press references in the following sections were located using the Integrum 
full-text database. 
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with parliament, El’tsin wrote, “Besides democratic guarantees and the correct international 
policy, [Russia] needs decency and discipline from its citizens. This is not the American model… 
Russia's special nature has made itself felt in the last two years in all its entirety. We have only 
to listen to it carefully. And then everything will be right.” (Yeltsin 1994, 175–176) His 1994 
address to parliament exhibited this mix of Russian exceptionalism and national mythologizing, 
introducing the concept of “co-citizenship” [sograzhdanstvo] to reconcile the contradiction 
between the ethnic and administrative principles of governance in Russia’s federal system. In 
this vein, he chastised leaders of ethnic republics for cultivating a sense of identity and even 
citizenship separate from Russian [rossiiskii] citizenship, complaining that, “it is unconstitutional 
and therefore unacceptable to divide people as ‘native’ or ‘non-native’ nationalities.” At the 
same time, he lavished attention on ethnic Russians as a state-bearing people: 
The protection and strengthening of the federal government directly depends upon the 
national disposition [samochuvstvie] of [ethnic] Russians. …Russians comprise an 
absolute majority of the population - 83%. They are not threated by assimilation, 
neglect of native language, or loss of national traditions. At the same time, it is 
impossible to discount a range of problems that Russians encounter, especially in 
certain republics of the Federation and in areas that border conflict zones (El’tsin 1994). 
In this fashion, El’tsin framed ethnic Russians as secure and dominant within the Russian state, 
but simultaneously as victims of ethnocratic republics and as refugees from neighboring conflict 
zones.  
El’tsin’s contradictory approach to civic nationality found its political expression in the 
near-constant turmoil surrounding his government’s nationalities ministry. In the midst of 
transition from Soviet rule, the State Committee on Nationalities Policy was created in 1991. 
Initially the Committee was put under the leadership of Gennadii Burbulis and Sergei Shakhrai, 
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then the academic Valerii Tishkov of the Institute for Anthropology and Ethnography was 
appointed to lead the Committee in 1992. Tishkov was a firm advocate of civic nation-building 
and argued for doing away with Soviet-era categories of multinationality [mnogonarodnost’] and 
ethnicity [etnos]. His draft nationalities concept paper in 1992 recognized “the individual’s right 
to choose his or her own cultural identity and to have his or her interests and needs translated 
into reality.” (Batyrshin 1992a) At the same time, the draft concept acknowledged the right of 
self-government and called for implementing the 1992 Federation Treaty.9 With respect to the 
ethnic Russian population, the concept devoted substantial attention to the need for improving 
living conditions in predominantly Russian regions and “the revival of the culture of the Russian 
people,” though it also warned that the dominant ethnicity should not be allowed to stunt the 
development of indigenous peoples by usurping economic resources.  
From the start, Tishkov was frustrated by the persistence of Soviet-era nationalities 
policy. In one illustrative moment, he recalls El’tsin asking, “Should we allocate more resources 
and support for any one of the republics in North Caucasus, say Dagestan, so as to make it a kind 
of stronghold in the region?” Yet at other times he indicated a desire for a “scientific basis” for 
nationalities policy, with the result being that neither was achieved (Tishkov 1997, 63–67). He 
was further frustrated by bureaucratic duplication, the predominance of personal ties, and 
policy incoherence – a common feature of El’tsin-era politics and generally of post-Soviet hybrid 
regimes:  
                                                          
9 The Federation Treaty, signed on 14 March 1992, formalized the preservation of Russia’s ethno-federal 
system following the Soviet Union’s collapse. The Treaty granted significant concurrent powers to the 
ethnic republics alongside the federal government and guaranteed their (over-)representation in the 
federal parliament. (Kahn 2002, 126–132) After the October 1993 constitutional crisis, the new 
constitution adopted in December 1993 preserved much of the Federation Treaty but significantly scaled 
back the republics’ reserved and concurrent powers. 
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In policy-making today, political improvisation prevails. Every person at the top has his 
own nationalities policy. I realize that the President is one thing, but when, for example, 
the Vice-President has his own style in this sphere. The same can be said about the 
institution of presidential aides and advisers, who also have their own "national" 
sympathies. (Batyrshin 1992b) 
Tishkov’s draft nationalities concept proposed transforming the State Committee on 
Nationalities Policy into a “superministry” featuring a system of representatives throughout 
Russia, bearing the power to review all decisions by federal agencies affecting nationalities 
policy and whose acts would be binding on all regional governments. The proposal was political 
over-reach and it doomed Tishkov politically. After resigning, he recommended Shakhrai as his 
successor. As one commentator observed, it was the first time that El’tsin followed the advice of 
his “powerless and unknown” minister (Kuznetsova 1992). 
In serving simultaneously as deputy Prime Minister and head of the State Committee, 
Shakhrai brought a measure of political authority that the office lacked under Tishkov. His 11-
point nationalities policy emphasized federalism, de-politicization of nationalities policy, 
peaceful conflict resolution, deferral to elected bodies “whether the center likes them or not”, 
and the “indivisibility of economic policy.” However, Shakhrai viewed discord among central 
authorities as the main threat to Russia’s territorial integrity (Rodin 1993). Emblematic of the 
divisions within government was that the State Committee, parliament, and government 
structures held conferences and roundtables with regional leaders at the same time that the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs assessed them as threats to the country’s stability (Pestrukhina 
1993).   
The committee was re-named in 1993 to the State Committee on Federation and 
Nationalities Policy, reflecting a preference for filtering nationalities issues through federal 
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institutions. At the same time, Shakhrai explained that asymmetrical (ethno-federal) federalism 
was a legacy of Soviet-era understandings of federalism in terms of “capacity to resolve the 
nationalities question.” (Shakhrai 1993) He argued that this older approach contradicted the 
new form of federalism practiced in post-Soviet Russia, and that it should be viewed as a 
transitional mechanism while national-cultural autonomy could serve as a means to provide 
minority ethnic groups with recognition without risking separatism. At the same time, Shakhrai 
criticized the government for providing the State Committee with insufficient resources. His 
response was to found the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES), which he envisioned as a 
“party of the regions” to cooperate with the government, adopting the slogan “family, property, 
Motherland.” (Batyrshin 1993)  
In 1994, the committee merged with the State-Committee on Socio-Economic 
Development of the North and became a full-fledged Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Regional 
Policy. Shakhrai remained minister, but he was even less effusive about civic nation-building. His 
supporters were openly critical of El’tsin’s concept of “co-citizenship” (and even more critical of 
El’tsin’s lack of support for the new Ministry). In a scathing critique of El’tsin, Roman 
Abdulatipov (1995) complained of the lack of a coherent state nationalities policy: “We still have 
not shown the peoples of Russia the national ideas, the attractive policies, economics, values, or 
leaders around which they are supposed to unite. This is a very dangerous situation.” 
Specifically, the danger was that “some actors in the center spread wild opinions that [ethnic] 
Russians do not have statehood,” and that this could always be used to inflame inter-ethnic 
hostility as long as state nationalities policy remained undefined. Pushing back on the civic 
national project, Abdulatipov defended ethnic understandings of nationality in the name of 
ethnic Russians combined with an anti-Western complaint that, “The national spirit, culture, and 
traditions are under the control of Western cultural exports.” (Abdulatipov 1995) 
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Growing tensions over control of regional policy and duplication of government 
functions by the Presidential Administration led to Shakhrai’s dismissal in May 1994 (Kutsyllo 
1994; Sigal 1994). His departure accompanied the replacement of his supporters in the Ministry 
including Abdulatipov and Aleksandr Kotenkov, while Shakhrai was brought into the Presidential 
Administration to head the Presidential Council for Cadres Policy. However, he retained the post 
of Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for nationalities, regional, and legal policy, 
effectively ensuring future conflict with his successor in the nationalities ministry (Kuznets 1994; 
Parkhomenko 1994).  
By the mid-1990s, El’tsin began to resist expressions of non-Russian ethnicity in relation 
to political rights while promoting the cause of ethnic Russians as victims within their own state. 
He began to distance himself from radical democrats and burnished his Russian national 
credentials in the summer of 1994 (on the anniversary of Russia’s declaration of sovereignty) by 
visiting the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Aleksei II, nationalist writer Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn, and attending an exhibit by national artist Il’ya Glazunov (Tishkov 1997, 239). The 
war in Chechnya dominated (unsurprisingly) El’tsin’s address to parliament in 1995. In 
addressing the problem of the Russian diaspora, El’tsin used the blanket term “compatriots” 
[sootechestvenniki] to refer to both Russian citizens abroad and ethnic diaspora—a term favored 
by opponents of the civic nation-building within El’tsin’s regime. More subtly, El’tsin’s speech 
demonstrated the beginning of creeping centralization of nationalities policy: if his 1994 address 
emphasized the central role of civil society for the realization of national identities, the 1995 
speech described this as a governmental role.10  
                                                          
10 “The task of government is to help representatives of all peoples to formulate their own interests and 
to realize their responsibility within a united multinational society.” (El’tsin 1995) 
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In the nationalities ministry, Shakhrai’s replacement was the former Governor of 
Krasnodar Krai Nikolai Egorov. Egorov’s appointment appeared to be El’tsin’s first decisive step 
away from the civic national project. He earned a reputation in Krasnodar by refusing (along 
with Moscow’s Yurii Luzhkov) to eliminate the local residency permit [propisk] system, 
discouraging migration from the South, and developing a “common language” with local 
Cossacks. He supported Abkhazia in its war with Georgia and, along with his deputy, Vadim 
Pechenev, became known as a “great power” ideologue (Sigal 1994; Vyzhutovich 1996).  
Chechnya also dominated Egorov’s tenure as Nationalities Minister – indeed, he was 
forced to resign in June 1995 in the wake of the Budennovsk crisis11 and parliament’s threat of a 
vote of no confidence in the government (Volkov 1995). He quickly moved into the Kremlin, 
becoming Presidential Advisor on regional and nationalities policy in August 1995 (Kostochkina 
1995) and then Head of the Presidential Administration in January 1996. According to Russia’s 
long-serving human rights ombudsman, Sergei Kovalev, Egorov’s rise meant that the 
discriminatory nationalities policies developed in Krasnodar (favoring Cossacks, Russians, and 
Slavs, while aggressive towards refugees and migrants from the Caucasus and Meskhetian 
Turks) had come to the federal level (Tsanava 1998).  
The 1995-6 period was dominated by the national electoral cycle and El’tsin’s struggle to 
stay in power. During this time, he energetically promoted the Union of Russia and Belarus, 
believing that most voters held to some mix of neo-Soviet and ethnic Russian identities (Tolz 
2001, 256). Following his re-election, El’tsin unveiled a competition to define a new Russian 
“national idea” in July 1996, though the outcome was an uninspiring series of essays supportive 
                                                          
11 On June 14, 1995, Chechen separatists led by Shamil Basaev launched an attack on neighboring 
Stavropol krai and then took entire hospital hostage. Russian authorities launched three failed assaults to 
free the hospital, resulting in many civilian casualties. The authorities were forced to agree to a ceasefire 
that allowed Basaev to return to Chechnya safely.  
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of state patriotism in the government’s newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta (K. E. Smith 2002; Tolz 
2001). Meanwhile, Vyacheslav Mikhailov was appointed Egorov’s successor as nationalities 
minister. Mikhailov previously served as vice-chairman of the State Committee under Shakhrai, 
rising to First Deputy Minister under Egorov (Sokolova 1995). The Ministry was re-named once 
more in 1996 as the Ministry for Nationality Affairs and Federal Relations.  
Mikhailov’s chief accomplishment was to oversee the completion of the Concept of 
State Nationalities Policy. The preamble of the State Nationalities Concept adopted in June 1996 
demonstrated a striking continuity with El’tsin’s earlier expression of the foundational role 
played by the ethnic Russian population: 
The country’s dominant majority peoples for centuries formed an ethnic community, 
and in this sense, they are native peoples that played a historical role in the establishing 
of Russian statehood. The unique unity, variety, spiritual community, and union of 
different peoples was preserved on the territory of Russia thanks to the unifying role 
played by the [ethnic] Russian people (Rossiiskaya Gazeta 1996). 
The Concept further stated that, “Inter-ethnic relations in the country to a great extent are 
determined by the national disposition of the [ethnic] Russian people, which is the foundation of 
Russian statehood.” The problems faced by other peoples were lumped together as bearing 
“equal significance” that should be addressed by “adequate representation of all peoples” in 
federal, regional, and local government. In addressing the issue of the Russian diaspora, the 
Concept even invoked a nonsensical category of “ethnic Rossiyane.”12  
Commenting on the content of the Concept, Mikhailov drew particular attention to the 
status and concerns of ethnic Russians: 
                                                          
12 See also discussion in Malakhov (2008).  
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In the center of attention of Russian society today is the problem of the Russian people 
[russkii narod], the largest state-bearing nation in the country. …the general situation in 
Russia, including the area of inter-ethnic relations, greatly depends on the disposition of 
the Russian people. And here there are many problems that cause alarm. …The 
objective demands for the development of the Russian people should be fully reflected 
in statewide and regional programs. In this sense, the Concept for State National Policy 
does not set the interests of the Russian people against those of other peoples. It 
stresses that Russians' problems should be resolved in the context of the renewal of the 
national life of the Federation, and of corresponding foreign policy directed towards 
strengthening Russia's ties with the CIS and Baltics. (Pliev 1996) 
Mikhailov stressed the centuries-long experience of tolerance and unity in Russia. In the 
Concept and in Mikhailov’s discussion, one clearly sees long-standing Soviet-era legacies 
enacted in familiar tropes of a brotherhood of nations with ethnic Russian leadership. The direct 
link drawn between nationalities policy and foreign policy similarly echoed policy repertoires of 
the previous era. However, one could detect a subtle shift in policy towards the Russian 
diaspora (still described as “compatriots”), expressed as concern for protecting their national-
cultural ways of life and spiritual ties with Russia rather than pursuing repatriation (Grankina 
1996). 
A concrete step towards institutionalizing civic nationhood was El’tsin’s decree of March 
1997 abolishing the “fifth line” in internal passports that indicated citizens’ ethnicity, despite 
popular support for keeping ethnicity in internal passports and objections from powerful ethnic 
republics (Aktürk 2010). Despite this success, El’tsin’s concern for publicly defining a unifying 
national idea diminished rapidly after his re-election and his annual addresses to parliament in 
1996-1998 made virtually no mention of nationality (El’tsin 1996; El’tsin 1997; El’tsin 1998). The 
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hint of anti-Westernism layered into his earlier memoirs became much more pronounced, 
growing in proportion to distress over NATO’s expansion and its military intervention in the 
Balkans. In his 1999 address, he excoriated “NATO aggressors” for their campaign in Serbia and 
concluded by thoroughly mixing civic and ethnic nationalist appeals: “There is no need to think 
up abstract national ideas. Our real national task, as precisely said by Solzhenitsyn, is to 
safeguard the nation. After all Russia is not just territory or government. Russia is above all 
people. …Russians [rossiyane] created a great power. And the might of Russia grows with its 
people.” (El’tsin 1999) 
Just as nationalities policy became more presidential (and contradictory), the waning 
years of El’tsin’s presidency were not kind to the nationalities ministry. Mikhailov was forced to 
resign along with the rest of Viktor Chernomyrdin’s government in May 1998. The ministry was 
re-branded the Ministry for Regional and Nationalities Policy, but locating a new minister proved 
a difficult task. Mikhailov was appointed to the Presidential Security Council, continuing the 
transfer of the nationalities portfolio to the Presidential Administration. In his wake, there were 
few candidates anxious “to head an ideological ministry that has no real financial levers and no 
significant influence.” (Nagornykh 1998) Eventually, Evgenii Sapiro, former speaker of the Perm 
regional Duma, was tapped for the position. He proved politically acceptable owing to his lack of 
connections with existing lobbying groups in Moscow – in fact, he did not even bring any of his 
team members with him from Perm’ to Moscow. However, Sapiro lacked any practical 
experience working with nationalities (Kholmskaya and Kamyshev 1998). Sapiro answered to 
Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko, who made budgetary federalism and local self-
government priorities for the ministry. Nationalities policy took a backseat to economics as the 
basis for center-regional relations, with the Ministry seeking to level-up the status of Russia’s 
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provinces to equal the ethnic republics (Karelin 1998a). Sapiro also began to dismantle the 
Ministry’s department for working with the Russian diaspora (Karelin 1998b). 
In short order, the Ministry was dissolved and split into a Ministry for Nationalities 
Policy, led by Ramazan Abdulatipov (who previously criticized El’tsin’s civic national project), and 
a Ministry for Regional Policy, led by Valerii Kirpichnikov. Abdulatipov dismantled the Ministry’s 
department for Russian diaspora, dividing it into two directorates: one devoted to preparing 
bureaucrats for work abroad instead of managing relations with Russian diaspora communities; 
the other employed just nine specialists (previously there were 21), of whom only one had 
experience in the area (Karelin 1998b). 
The following year, the Ministry for Regional Policy was dissolved and its powers re-
allocated to a new ministry on the basis of the Ministry for Nationalities Policy, now known as 
the Ministry for Federation Affairs and Nationalities. The Ministry was once more led by 
Mikhailov, who could not help but lament its pathetic condition: 
…everything has come full circle and again, as concerns the Ministry itself, everything 
starts from the beginning. Not entirely from scratch, no: the Nationalities Policy Concept 
has been adopted, there are cadres from the two dissolved ministries, there is 
groundwork. But even still, there is no reality to the Ministry for Federation Affairs and 
Nationalities as an instrument for realizing policy for the Russian government. We have 
to start from the beginning… (Zemlyanoi and Kasaev 1999) 
Mikhailov likely knew the Ministry’s fate was already determined. He was replaced in 2000 by 
the former ambassador to Azerbaijan, Aleksandr Blokhin.  
To sum up, there is ample evidence that El’tsin was never fully committed to a civic 
nation-building project. While he insisted upon the use of rossiiskii rather than russkii to 
describe the nation, he also ethnicized the civic concept. Ethnic Russians were described early 
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and often as the cornerstone of Russian statehood and their interests articulated in terms of all-
state interests. He insisted on the priority of looking after the ethnic Russian diaspora beyond 
Russia’s borders early in his presidency. He maintained a belief in Russian exceptionalism as 
binding regime and nation:  
Russia is a country of moods and emotions. That's just the way we're constructed; 
nothing can be done about it. In politics, these emotions and moods sometimes 
intertwine in the most outlandish way. Suppose there is a person in power in Russia 
who always provokes the harshest criticism and sometimes even anger. It is precisely 
this leader who will automatically become a powerful political center and consolidate 
the most diverse forces (Yeltsin 2000, 274).13 
In El’tsin’s televised farewell address in 1999, he even connected national exceptionalism with 
the vote for his successor: “I have always believed in the marvelous wisdom of Russians. For this 
reason, I have no doubt what choice you will make at the end of March 2000.” (El’tsin 2000) In 
this manner, the relationship between nationality and regime became increasingly evident in 
what Pain (2016) has termed the “imperial syndrome” in Russian nationalism, combining 
elements of exceptionalism, defensive imperialism, and the political domination of ethnic 
Russians. 
 
COMPARING REGIME EFFECTS ON CIVIC NATION-BUILDING 
In total, from 1991 to 1999 there were eight different incarnations of Russia’s nationalities 
ministry and as many changes in its leadership (see TABLE 1). In the midst of this process, it was 
also alleged that the central government became increasingly Russified as representation of 
                                                          
13  It is perhaps worth noting that El’tsin wrote these words in relation to his appointment of Evgenii 
Primakov as Prime Minister. By contrast, he described his successor, Vladimir Putin, as a calming 
influence. 
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non-Russians dwindled in appointed offices. Tishkov reports that, “in 1996, no more than three 
or four non-Russians remained among the 40 high-ranking administrators of the federal 
government's apparatus.” According to the Ministry’s own accounting in 1997, the ethnic 
makeup of its employees consisted of 334 Russians, 22 Ukrainians, 9 Chechens, 5 Belorussians, 7 
Germans, 5 Tatars, 4 Ossetians, and 3 Azerbaijanis. (Tishkov 1997, 259; Tsagolov 1997)  
As the nationalities portfolio was absorbed into the Presidential Administration, the 
Ministry became a dumping ground for cast-offs from other ministries and departments that 
previously dealt with nationalities-related concerns (Kholmskaya and Kamyshev 1998). One of 
Shakhrai’s deputies, Ismail Aliev, complained that the Ministry became “a kind of holding tank 
into which they crammed… retired generals, deputies, and high-ranking bureaucrats, possessing 
but a dim understanding of nationalities policy.” (Aliev 1998) 
In a final flurry of re-organization under Putin, the ministry absorbed powers from the 
Ministry for CIS Affairs, Federal Migration Service, and State Committee for the North, becoming 
the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality, and Migration Policy in 2000. In 2001, the 
government’s “most useless ministry” was dissolved and its powers redistributed among the 
Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry for Economic Policy and Development 
(Airapetova 2001). Responsibility for nationalities was tasked to Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir 
Zorin (minister without portfolio) until 2004, when it was effectively re-created as a department 
within the new Ministry of Regional Development. After the latter’s dissolution in 2014, the 
department was transferred to the Ministry of Culture until Putin announced the creation of a 
Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs in 2015 (Ukaz Prezidenta… 2015). 
The popular ambivalence in relation to civic nationality bears a clear relationship with 
El’tsin’s inability to articulate a convincing civic national identity and his recourse to Soviet-era 
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ethnic tropes, Russian exceptionalism, and anti-Westernism.14 The push-pull relationship 
between Yeltin’s pragmatism in his identity politics and the constant reshuffling of the 
nationalities ministry meant that no codified definition or unifying myth regarding the meaning 
of Russian national identity (civic or ethnic) took root, aside from the definition of citizenship in 
the 1993 constitution and the Soviet inheritance of ethno-linguistic and territorial nationality. 
Today, Putin’s utilization of patriotic appeals represents a continuation of ambivalent nation-
building begun in the 1990s – itself a consequence of regime dynamics. 
 While the nationalities ministry provides a useful case study, its travails were 
symptomatic of regime dynamics. One also finds continual institutional reorganizations and 
contradictory policy-making in immigration policy. Malakhov (2014, 1066) cites a particularly 
illustrative moment in October 2001 that joined the fates of nationalities and immigration 
policy, when Putin publicly called on ‘compatriots’ in former Soviet states to return to Russia 
only to disband the responsible ministry five days later. In a detailed examination of Russia’s 
immigration policy, Caress Schenk (2018) reveals that such legal and institutional zigzags are 
means to creating shortages of legal migrant labor. In turn, the scarcity of legal labor serves as a 
patronage resource for elites that undergirds a “multi-level balancing act of migration 
management.” In this sense, the ambivalent and contradictory outcomes in nationalities and 
immigration policies are symptomatic of Russia’s system of informal governance (Ledeneva 
2013). 
The link between regime dynamics and nation-building outcomes is further suggested 
by Ukraine’s post-Soviet experience, though the conditions for civic nation-building were rather 
different. Ukraine’s 1996 constitution made explicit a civic definition of the nation, though 
                                                          
14 This is not to say that there is an inherent tie between ethnic tropes and anti-Westernism, particularly 
as the latter may also be found in neo-imperial nationalism. Rather, this combination reflects the tactical 
and evolving nature of Yeltsin’s nationalities policy. My thanks to Katie Stewart for this point.  
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walked a finer line with respect to minority ethnicities and languages and especially with regard 
to its 11 million ethnic Russians and the even larger community of Russophones (Wilson 2002, 
205–211). While Ukraine avoided ethno-federalism, substantial portions of the country in the 
East and South (including Crimea) were Russified and much of the country’s electoral history 
came to be understood in terms of Western vs Eastern Ukraine. Beyond the Russian question, 
Ukraine’s complicated historical and ethnic patchwork led to chronic scholarly debates about 
the number of politically-salient cultural and linguistic regions, ranging from two to as many as 
eight (L. Barrington and Faranda 2009; L. W. Barrington and Herron 2004; Birch 2000; O’Loughlin 
2001; Katchanovski 2006).  
Despite the structural differences between Russia and Ukraine, both countries featured 
similar varieties of hybrid regimes in the 1990s and early-2000s and civic nation-building took a 
similar path. As in El’tsin’s Russia, Ukraine’s government advanced a civic national project 
premised upon inclusive citizenship, extensive protections of individual rights, and guarantees 
for minority languages and cultures (Shulman 2002). However, as Shevel (2011b, 186–187) 
observes, Ukraine’s nationalities ministry and its successors became deeply politicized in 
bureaucratic disputes. Similar to Russia’s experience, the ministry underwent constant change 
and cycling of leadership, taking on eight different incarnations (including subordination to two 
other ministries) with 15 different directors (see TABLE 2). The intertwining of the ministry’s 
operations with corrupt politics continued even after the apparent opening offered by the 
Orange Revolution.15 Perhaps unsurprisingly, ethnicizing practices persisted in both national and 
local policy-making despite formal civic nation-building, such that Karina Korostelina (2013, 312) 
                                                          
15 In rapid succession, the committee was hit with a series of scandals the new director was poached by 
the government to be Deputy Interior Minister, followed by allegations of embezzlement to the tune of 
one million hryvnias (about US$200,000), public accusations of corruption and falsifying documents, and 
then misuse of public funds to support the pro-government party in 2006 (Shevel 2011b, 188). 
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found the country’s intellectual landscape to be “deficient in liberal civic ideologies that define 
society as a community of equal citizens independently of their ethnicity, language, or 
religion.”16  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that the fate of Russia’s civic nation-building project was sealed by the 
combination of personalist politics and institutional instability that were characteristic of hybrid 
regime politics in the 1990s. The conventional portrayals of El’tsin as either a firm proponent of 
civic nation-building or as uninterested in national identity both miss the mark. Similarly, it is not 
the case that the Russian government left nationalist opposition actors to structure the debate 
on Russian ethnicity. El’tsin’s approach to nationalities policy might have been pragmatic and 
bureaucratic, but he was hardly a disinterested actor. Though the nationalities ministry began as 
a platform for civic nation-building, it quickly fell victim to intra-regime competition and 
responsibility for nationalities policy came to be absorbed into the Presidential Administration. 
In this fashion, regime politics obstructed the government’s efforts at civic nation-building. 
Putin essentially continued the regime’s formal commitment to civic nation-building 
while maintaining a practical ambivalence. Starting with his “millennium manifesto” (Putin 
1999), he emphasized the importance of patriotism and traditional cultural values. Throughout 
the 2000s, the Kremlin was hesitant to embrace ethnic nationalism given its unpredictable and 
                                                          
16 While Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2018) find movement in the direction of civic identification 
(understood in terms of identification of Ukraine as one’s homeland) since Euromaidan, it is impossible to 
disentangle this finding from the effects of conflict with Russia. Anecdotally, observers of Ukrainian 
politics often quip that the conflict with Russia has done more to unify Ukraine than two decades of 
independence. 
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potentially destabilizing consequences (Hale 2016).17 Over time, however, Putin’s government 
filled an ambivalent civic nationhood with more popular ethnic content, including traditional 
Russian values, Orthodox religion, and Russian language, together with anti-Westernism and 
Soviet-era nostalgia. The continuity between El’tsin’s and Putin’s nationalities policy was 
exemplified by the government’s revised nationalities policy concept, which was drafted in 2012 
by four previous nationalities ministers whose experience spanned the 1990s and early 2000s: 
Valerii Tishkov, Vyacheslav Mikhailov, Vladimir Zorin, and Ramazan Abdulatipov. In commenting 
on the response to the draft policy from Russia’s regions, Mikhailov disclosed that the ministers 
were criticized for formulating a nationalities policy without a national idea (Gorodetskaya 
2012).  
When considered from a theoretical perspective, this observation suggests a reversal of 
traditional ways of considering the relationship between national identity and regime type: 
rather than ethnic nationalism fostering authoritarianism and civic nationalism fostering 
democracy, Russia’s experience demonstrates how competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s 
confounded the regime’s own efforts to institutionalize civic nationality and laid the groundwork 
for the ‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics under Putin. It is important to stress that ambivalent 
nation-building is a regime outcome more than a specific policy goal: the Kremlin pursues anti-
extremism and cultivation of ethnic tolerance even as it selectively endorses popular demands 
for ethno-nationalism, effectively using identity politics to regulate political competition (Goode 
2012). Understanding ambivalent nation-building as a regime outcome further answers 
Chapman et al’s (2018, 392) call to examine state policy and messaging to make sense of uneven 
                                                          
17 It is worth noting that Putin’s apparent embrace of nationalist legitimation with the annexation of 
Crimea was immediately complicated by the undeclared war in eastern Ukraine and the questions raised 
about Russia’s perceived obligations to Russian-speakers in the Donbas (Kolstø 2016b; Laruelle 2016).  
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levels of xenophobia given “the contradictory relationship between government sponsored anti-
immigrant campaigns combined with relatively benign official rhetoric on minorities in Russia.” 
This study further suggests that scholars of nationalism and ethnic politics may gain new 
insights into the relationship between regime type and social identities by problematizing 
institutional instability. Much of contemporary constructivist research examines the 
manipulation of identity repertoires and boundaries in democratic states with relatively stable 
institutions, with particular emphasis on the ways that institutions create incentives for political 
actors to manipulate or cross ethnic boundaries (Chandra 2012; Wimmer 2013). A broad range 
of institutions - potentially including educational, language, legal, cultural, and military 
structures - produce and sustain a pervasive and visible sense of ethnic unity or group-ness 
(Brubaker 2004; Harty 2001). By the same token, state institutions may strengthen ethnic 
differences in ways that reinforce rather than diminish social cleavages (Lieberman 2009; 
Lieberman and Singh 2012). However, institutional instability augments the availability of 
identity repertoires in various ways – for instance, by eliminating the standardized menu of 
identity choices, severing the expectation of resources bound to group identities, or 
complicating the attribution of ethnic grievances. Importantly, institutional instability proved to 
be acceptable to Russian elites who benefited from access to rents, the ability to limit political 
and economic competition, and weak accountability (Hellman 1998; Melville and Mironyuk 
2016).  
The situation in Russia differed not only from standard constructivist accounts of 
identity politics in stable institutional environments, but also from accounts that treated 
institutional instability as a dimension of regime transition. In Jack Snyder’s (2000) “elite 
persuasion model,” for example, post-communist elites threatened by democratization may be 
tempted to stoke nationalist conflict to maintain power, exploiting lingering media control and 
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weak institutional accountability characteristic of transitional regime dynamics. Yet such threats 
were unlikely to materialize where elite incentives converged around opaque governance and 
oligarchical control. The result for civic nation-building was thus symptomatic of the fate of 
democratization—or more accurately, the sources of hybrid regime stability and 
autocratization—in post-Soviet Russia. 
The absence of a consistent and institutionalized approach to civic nation-building 
further suggests that nation-building in Russia was society-led (rather than state-led), highly 
diverse, and formed at least partly in response to the state’s obvious failings during the 1990s 
(Oushakine 2009). The key to understanding the recent ‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics may thus 
be to scrutinize the disconnect between everyday nationalism and elite or official nationalism. 
There is a growing body of literature that addresses the ways national identities are shaped and 
mobilized within society through citizens’ everyday practices (Brubaker et al. 2006; Fox and 
Miller-Idriss 2008; Goode and Stroup 2015). While these studies tend to be situated within 
stable states with developed institutions, the weak institutional environment of hybrid regimes 
presents an opportunity to examine the “bottom-up” influence of everyday nationalism.  
Finally, such an approach potentially helps to account for the choices made by post-
Soviet autocrats to seek out nationalist legitimation, even when it appears to go against their 
interests. While elites sometimes advance nationalist projects that do not resonate with the 
masses, they are more likely to organize and give shape to already-existing vernacular 
nationalisms (Whitmeyer 2002). El’tsin’s regime left behind an unconvincing formal edifice of 
civic nation-building and a great many vernacular ethnic repertoires. Putin added these 
repertoires to his legitimation strategy in piecemeal fashion, borrowing from previous historical 
eras, common-sense dimensions of Russian national identity, and competing elite 
constituencies—in effect, a balancing act of maintaining popular appeal while managing political 
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competition. This manner of fusing cultural and historical legacies with popular appeal is 
particularly evident, for instance, in the regime’s promotion of patriotic sporting events (Arnold 
2018). Yet the more diluted the already-vague notion of civic nationality, the easier it was for 
elites as well as ordinary Russians to fill the concept with ethnic content. The long-term concern 
for the Kremlin, then, is whether its version of civic nationhood (presented under the rubric of 
patriotism) secures legitimacy for the regime, or whether a widening gap between official and 
everyday nationalism gives rise to a potentially volatile combination of official conformism and 
informal ethnic outbidding.  
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FIGURE 2: RUSSIANS’ SENSE OF UNITY 
 
 
Source: L. M. Drobizheva. 2017. “Grazhdanskaya Identichnost’ Kak Uslovie Oslableniya Etnicheskogo 
Negativizma.” Mir Rossii 26 (1): 7–31. 
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FIGURE 3: CHARACTERIZATION OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS AS A NATION 
 
 
Source: Analiticheskii Tsentr Yurii Levady. 2018. Obshchestvennoe Mnenie - 2017: Ezhegodnik. Moscow: 
Levada-Tsentr. https://www.levada.ru/sbornik-obshhestvennoe-mnenie/obshhestvennoe-mnenie-
2017/. 
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FIGURE 4: PREFERRED GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS MIGRANTS 
 
 
Source: Analiticheskii Tsentr Yurii Levady. 2018. Obshchestvennoe Mnenie - 2017: Ezhegodnik. Moscow: 
Levada-Tsentr. https://www.levada.ru/sbornik-obshhestvennoe-mnenie/obshhestvennoe-mnenie-
2017/. 
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TABLE 1: RUSSIA’S NATIONALITIES MINISTRIES, 1991-2015 
 
Year Name Director/Minister 
1991 State Committee on Nationalities Policy Gennadii Burbulis/ 
Sergei Shakhrai 
1992   Valerii Tishkov 
1992-1993   Sergei Shakhrai 
1993 State Committee on Federation and Nationalities 
Policy 
Sergei Shakhrai  
1994 Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy Sergei Shakhrai 
1994-1995   Nikolai Egorov  
1995-1996   Vyacheslav Mikhailov 
1996 Ministry for Nationality Affairs and Federal Relations Vyacheslav Mikhailov 
1998 Ministry for Regional and Nationalities Policy Evgenii Sapiro 
1998-1999 Ministry for Nationality Policy Ramazan Abdulatipov 
1998-1999 Ministry for Regional Policy Valerii Kirpichnikov 
1999-2000 Ministry for Federation Affairs and Nationalities Vyacheslav Mikhailov 
2000   Aleksandr Blokhin 
2000-2001 Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality, and 
Migration Policy 
Aleksandr Blokhin 
2001-2004 [minister without portfolio responsible for 
nationalities affairs] 
Vladimir Zorin 
2004 Department of Inter-Ethnic Relations (Ministry of 
Regional Development) 
Yurii Balakhnin 
2006   Aleksandr Zhuravskii 
2013 Department of State Policy for Inter-Ethnic Relations 
(Ministry of Regional Development) 
Aleksandr Zhuravskii 
2014 Department of Inter-Ethnic Relations (Ministry of 
Culture) 
Aleksandr Zhuravskii 
2015-present Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs Igor' Barinov 
 
 
Table 1
TABLE 2: UKRAINE’S NATIONALITIES MINISTRIES, 1993-2015 
 
Year Name Director/Minister 
1993 Ministry for Nationalities and Migration Oleksandr Yemets’  
1994 Ministry of Nationalities, Migration, and Cults Mykola Shul’ha  
1995 Ministry of Nationalities and Migration Volodomyr Yevtukh  
1996 State Committee for Nationalities and 
Migration 
Volodomyr Yevtukh 
1998  Mykola Rud’ko  
2000 Department for Nationalities and Migration 
(Ministry of Justice) 
Hryhorii Sereda  
2001 State Committee for Nationalities and 
Migration 
Hryhorii Sereda 
2002  Hennadii Moskal  
2005  Serhii Rudyk  
2006 State Committee for Nationalities and 
Religion 
Serhii Rudyk 
2007  Heorhii Popov  
2008-2009  Oleksandr Sahan’  
2009-2010  Yurii Reshetnikov  
2010  Yurii Bohuts’kyi  
2011 Department of Religious Affairs and 
Nationalities (Ministry of Culture) 
Volodymyr Lyubchik  
2013  Mikhailo Moshkol  
2014  Volodymyr Yushkevych  
2014-present  Andrii Yurash  
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